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HOW PERRIS V. HEXAMER WAS LOST IN THE SHADOW OF BAKER V. SELDEN
Zvi S. Rosen*
INTRODUCTION
As part of this symposium on forgotten cases in intellectual property law, Perris v. Hexamer
stands out as a case that is equal parts important and forgotten. It is obviously important—it is
one of a preciously small number of United States Supreme Court decisions on the
idea/expression dichotomy,1 but it is mostly forgotten in favor of the Court’s decision the
following year in Baker v. Selden.2 It is equally obscure—Westlaw counts 2,787 citations of
Baker v. Selden, and 82 of Perris v. Hexamer.3 Yet the subject matter of both decisions is
surprisingly similar, and these cases tell us far more about the boundaries of copyright law when
considered in tandem than when either one is considered on its own. This piece will seek to tell
the story of Perris v. Hexamer—in terms of both the background of the controversy and the
procedural track of the lawsuit, as well as discussing the decision itself. Following this, two
questions will be addressed—firstly, why Perris was largely forgotten as a decision about the
idea/expression dichotomy, and secondly, why the vote among the Justices was different in
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Zvi S. Rosen is a Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at the George Washington University
School of Law, as well as the author of the blog Mostly IP History. He would like to thank the participants in this
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Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 606 (1998).

2

See, e.g., Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 464

(1989).
3

Citing references to Baker v. Selden, WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I1dab47e7b65511d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4/kcCitingReferences.html
(enter “Baker v. Selden” in search field; select “Baker v. Selden”; follow “citing references” hyperlink); Citing
references to Perris v. Hexamer, WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I3eb9bfa1b5bc11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/kcCitingReferences.html
(enter “Perris v. Hexamer” in search field; select “Perris v. Hexamer”; follow “citing references” hyperlink).
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Perris than in Baker. Finally, this piece will argue that Perris v. Hexamer offers insight into the
scope of copyright protection that continues to be relevant with the major cases of today.
I. THE CASE
A series of urban fires in the first half of the nineteenth century spurred insurers to realize
that mere listings of properties that held fire insurance policies that they had underwritten were
insufficient tools to adequately assess and manage their risk exposure.4 To this end, in 1850
William Perris, an English engineer, collaborated with the Jefferson Insurance Co. to produce
and market a fire map of New York City which would graphically illustrate the fire hazards of
properties and their adjoining lots.5 George T. Hope, secretary of the Jefferson Insurance Co., led
a committee of insurance men who devised the standards for color-coding and symbols to be
used to identify risk factors of particular properties and areas.6 Perris published his work in 1852,
under the title Maps of the City of New York Surveyed Under the Direction of Insurance
Companies of the Said City.7 This work was successful, and Perris and his partners would
successfully publish revised editions of this work until his death in 1863.8 Upon his passing, his
son William G. Perris succeeded his father in the business of producing and selling insurance
maps, in partnership with his brother-in-law Henry H. Browne.9

4

DIANE L. OSWALD, FIRE INSURANCE MAPS: THEIR HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 14 (Alma Maxwell and
Linda Barclay eds., 1997).
5

Id. at 15; WALTER W. RISTOW, AMERICAN MAPS AND MAPMAKERS 258 (1985).

6

OSWALD, supra note 4, at 16.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 16–17.

9

Transcript of Record at 13, Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879) (No. 357).
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The success of the Perris map created a “virtual cartographic gold rush” for engineers
across the country.10 One of the “most prolific” was Ernest Hexamer, a German immigrant and
civil engineer who had fled the aftermath of the revolution of 184811 and worked for Perris from
1852 to 1855.12 Having learned his craft there, in 1857 Hexamer relocated to Philadelphia where,
along with his partner William Lochner, he commenced production of a series of insurance
atlases entitled Maps of the City of Philadelphia.13 Under their partnership Lochner is believed to
have done most of the surveying, while Hexamer (along with his wife) colored, printed, and
bound the volumes.14 According to Hexamer he remained friendly with the elder Perris until
Perris’s death in 1863, and in 1862 the elder Perris had even acted as Hexamer’s sales agent in
New York City.15 Hexamer admitted that these maps used the same symbols, legend, and colors
to identify risk as used by Perris,16 and asserted that the elder Perris had encouraged him to do
so.17 As shown in the Appendix, though, the early editions of Hexamer’s maps use a key or

10

OSWALD, supra note 4, at 19.

11

Id.; RISTOW, supra note 5, at 260.

12

OSWALD, supra note 4, at 19.

13

Id. at 20. But see Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 6 (A third partner, Joseph Dietrich, is also
mentioned in Hexamer’s answer).
14

OSWALD, supra note 4, at 21.

15

Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 8.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 19. His exact words were that
[b]efore making this map I called on my friend, William Perris, and told him I intended to make an
insurance map of Philadelphia. He was very much pleased at hearing it, and suggested to me to use
the same key as he used, for the convenience of the insurance companies who would use my maps.
I accepted his offer, and did so.
Id.
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legend that is a literal copy of the legend for early editions of the Perris maps.18 Lochner would
leave the enterprise in 1860, and when Hexamer released his Insurance Maps of the City of
Philadelphia in 1872, a revised and expanded version of his earlier work, he was one of the most
successful regional fire map publishers.19 This revised version substituted a new legend and
symbols, and although it retained the same colors, assigned different meanings to them. 20
The immediate chain of events that led the younger Perris et al. to sue Hexamer for use of
the colors and symbols used by his father are not entirely clear. Hexamer’s answer stated that
until the summer of 1874, his right to use these colors and symbols had never been questioned,
but that in “July or August” of 1874 he had received a letter from the younger Perris asserting
that he was engaging in copyright infringement.21 In December of 1874, the younger Perris,
along with his brother-in-law and business partner, sister, and mother, sued Hexamer in the U.S.
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.22 The complaint was
drawn in broad terms, accusing Hexamer of infringement of Perris’s work, without making clear
that the maps were of different cities.23 However, the facts of the case were never truly at issue—
Hexamer filed an initial answer and then an amended answer, explaining that his maps were of
Philadelphia while the Perris maps were of New York city, and asserted that the only copied

18

See infra Part VI and note 167; see also Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 19.

19

OSWALD, supra note 4, at 21, 23.

20

Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 9.

21

Id. at 9, 21. A brief news clipping from July 29, 1874 indicates that a William Perris had been seriously
injured jumping from a window in New York City to avoid a fire the previous day. A Fire, ATLANTA CONST., July
29, 1874, at 2. One can speculate that the younger Perris may have been unable to work and needed money, but it is
not provable that this is the same individual.
22

Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 1–2.

23

See id. at 3.

4

material was the colors and symbols used in both maps.24 This was a slight exaggeration, as
indicated—in early editions of his maps the legend was a virtually photographic copy from
Perris’s maps.25
Some discovery was conducted in the case, and the depositions were preserved in the
record.26 The younger Perris and Henry H. Browne were both deposed, for the purpose of
establishing their title to the work of the elder Perris and to introduce documents to the record.27
Hexamer’s deposition, referenced above, discussed the circumstances of how he came to use the
legend created by Perris, and his use of different symbols and colors in more recent versions of
his insurance maps.28 A number of Philadelphia insurance men were also deposed, and asked
about the meaning and importance of certain symbols used by both atlases.29
The case did not present any real questions of disputed fact—at least regarding his
original fire maps of Philadelphia, Hexamer admitted that he had used the symbols and colors
used by Perris, and asserted that he had done so with his encouragement.30 There was no dispute
that Hexamer’s map was not a complete copy of the Perris maps, since a map of Philadelphia
cannot be a copy of a map of New York.31 However, the legend in the Hexamer map was copied

24

Id. at 6, 8.

25

See id. at 19.

26

See id. at 14–49.

27

See Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 9–11.

28

See id. at 19–24.

29

See id. at 24–25, 28–29.

30

Id. at 19.

31

See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1879).
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essentially verbatim from the Perris map, creating at least some issue of literal copying as well.32
In October of 1875 the matter was heard by the trial court, whose brief opinion was not
published, but is reproduced in the Transcript of Record submitted to the United States Supreme
Court on appeal.33 The court’s opinion was that
[t]he complainants are the representatives of the author of a map of the city
of New York, in which he embodied certain useful improvements, of which he is
alleged to have been the inventor. The defendants had made and published a map
of the city of Philadelphia, in which like improvements are alleged by the
complainants to be embodied as to the latter city.
The author under whom the complainants derive their title never obtained a
patent for the alleged invention, but obtained a copyright for the map only. Under
the patent conferring this copyright in the map, they alleged that the defendant's
map is an infringement of their exclusive right.
The court is of opinion that the bill cannot be sustained.
It is dismissed with costs.34
Put another way, the court held that Perris had produced a map, and embodied in that
map his system for marking and indicating fire risks. However, the suit was only brought on the
grounds of the copyright in the map Perris created, and that was not a viable ground for the
lawsuit.35 Copyright in a work does not include the system or idea embodied therein, it only
protects the expression of that idea.36 The fact that Hexamer had copied the legend verbatim
from the title page of the Perris map was still insufficient to lead to a finding of infringement.37

32

See Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 19.

33

Id. at 29.

34

Id. at 30.

35

See id. at 3.

36

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012).

37

See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1879).
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Perris et al. timely appealed to the United States Supreme Court in early 1876.38
However, it would be almost four years until the case was decided.39 This was not particularly
unusual—a number of factors led to the four year docket backlog in the court, including the
rigors of the Justices riding circuit much of the time,40 and the lack of a certiorari system that
meant the Supreme Court had no ability to control its docket.41 Counsel for Perris asked each
term following when the case would be heard, but it would not be heard until the October Term
of 1878.42 However, it is worth noting that not all cases took this long—for instance the three
cases that would become the Trade-Mark Cases were filed with the Supreme Court in January
and February of 1879; the cases were consolidated in April of 1879 and argument was heard in
October of the same year.43 Perris (and indeed Baker v. Selden) did not receive the same priority.
In their brief, counsel for Perris et al. argued that the legend of colors and symbols was an
integral and inseparable part of the copyrighted map, and that it was also copyrightable in and of
itself.44 Having made this argument, they then contended that although the legend used by

38

Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 30.

39

See Perris, 99 U.S. at 674.

40

See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 78 (1928) (“The Supreme Court’s business would doubtless have kept the Justices in
Washington and the practice of circuit attendance, as subsequent experience shows, would have become
atrophied.”).
Id. at 77 (“[M]ovement for a comprehensive reorganization of the judicial system made no headway in
Congress . . . congestion of the dockets became more and more ominous.”); see also Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 364 (2001) (“For
most of the Court’s history, the justices were obliged to hear many disputes . . . the Court’s docket skyrocketed.”).
41

42

Letter from Joshua Pusey, to Clerk, U.S. Sup. Ct. (Sept. 25, 1876) (on file with author); Letter from Joshua
Pusey, to Clerk, U.S. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 3, 1877) (on file with author).
43

Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The Nascent Treaty Power and the Turbulent Origins of
Federal Trademark Law, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 857–60, 866 (2009).
44

Brief for Appellants at 3–7, Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879) (No. 357).
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Hexamer was not a literal copy of the legend used by Perris, it was substantially and admittedly
based on the legend from the Perris map, and this was sufficient to be infringement.45 Finally,
counsel for the appellants did not dispute Hexamer’s testimony, but rather asserted that it did not
prove a license, and that in any case that license had been terminated.46
In response, counsel for Hexamer focused on the argument that the use of common colors
and symbols could not be copyright infringement.47 The brief for Hexamer opens with a nod to
what would come to be referred to as fair use, arguing that the Hexamer map did not compete
with or affect sales for the Perris map.48 Following that, Hexamer’s counsel focused on his
strongest argument—that Perris was attempting to protect a system or idea with copyright,
instead of attempting to receive a patent for that system.49 In addition to these arguments,
Hexamer’s counsel noted that Hexamer’s revised 1872 maps used a different legend, that any
infringement was de minimis, and that the doctrine of laches precluded the suit, as Hexamer had
been using the Perris system of colors and symbols since 1857.50
II. THE DECISION
Argument in the case was held Tuesday, December 17, 1878, and was concluded the
following day.51 On February 3, 1879, the Supreme Court issued its decision, and decisively

45

Id. at 12.

46

Id. at 14–15.

47

See Brief for Appellee at 5, Perris, 99 U.S. 674 (No. 357).

48

See id. at 3–4.

49

See id. at 3–5.

50

Id. at 6–9, 11.

51

United States Supreme Court Proceedings of 1878, CHI. L. NEWS, Dec. 21, 1878, at 112.
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sided with Hexamer.52 The opinion was originally assigned to Justice Clifford, but was
transferred to Chief Justice Waite.53 The Court’s opinion was fairly short, even for the time,
measuring about two pages of the United States Reports—less if you remove prefatory matter.54
After a brief recitation of the facts, the Court addressed the two issues before it—the allegations
of literal copying of the key, and the allegations of nonliteral copying for use of the colors and
symbols—in two paragraphs totaling under three hundred words and not a single citation.55
Although the opinion does not strictly distinguish the legal issues, the first paragraph is
addressed to the former question, and the second paragraph is generally addressed to the latter
issue.56
A. The First Holding: Actionable & De Minimis Copying
The Court first turned to the question of whether there had been what we now call
“actionable copying” or ”unlawful appropriation” depending on the Circuit—in this case,
whether the copying of the key was a sufficient copying to constitute infringement.57 In response
to this question the Court held that “to infringe [the exclusive right of reproduction] a substantial
copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced,”58 and thus the copying of the key was
insufficient to constitute infringement of the Perris maps.59 Given that the two maps “are not
52

Perris, 99 U.S. 674 (1879).

53

Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 1878, Perris v. Hexamer, No. 93, at 131 (on
file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32).
54

See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675–76.

55

See id. at 676.

56

See id.

57

Id.; see Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140–41 (1992).

58

Perris, 99 U.S. at 676.

59

Id. at 675–76.
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only not copies of each other, but they do not convey the same information,”60 there could be no
finding of infringement.61 In essence, the Court held that because the two maps were of different
cities and were thus fundamentally different works, the copying of the key was insufficient to
constitute infringement.62
The Court did not give a label for this doctrine, but at first this part of the decision was
cited and applied for by a number of cases following Perris.63 For instance, in Morrison v.
Pettibone the Court cited this rule from Perris to set aside a jury verdict of infringement and
order a new trial, holding that “infringement [that] was manifestly intended at any incomplete
stage, but was not carried out, cannot operate to turn the mere embryo into a copy.”64 Likewise,
the Ninth Circuit applied Perris, among other cases, in holding that even if, arguendo, Charlie
Chaplin had read the plaintiff’s book, Against Gray Walls or Lawyer's Dramatic Escapes, and
incorporated small parts into his film Modern Times, that did not mean that it rose to the level of
infringement.65 This rule would eventually lead to the doctrine of de minimis copying—that only
a small amount of copying does not rise to the level of infringement.66 However, Perris itself has
been rarely recognized as a major source of this doctrine.67

60

Id. at 676.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Walter Malins Rose, Notes on U.S. Reports, in 25 CASES ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT
705 (2d ed. 1901).

OF THE UNITED STATES
64

87 F. 330, 332 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897).

65

Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 1941).

66

Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).

67

See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:10 (2013). See infra Part V for a recent
exception.
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One interesting omission of the Court was the failure to use the still-new doctrine of fair
use to resolve the issue of actual copying.68 Many of the early fair use cases were argued by
counsel for Perris, but it is unclear to what extent the Court considered them.69 A number of
subsequent decisions would likewise discuss the holding of Perris regarding the substantiality of
copying required in the context of the fair use doctrine,70 but Perris does not apply the fair use
analysis from Folsom v. Marsh and subsequent cases, and is not generally recognized today as
part of the history of the fair use doctrine.71 Nonetheless, given that it has been forcefully argued
that Folsom v. Marsh itself was much more about the scope of infringement—just like the first
holding in Perris, it is entirely reasonable to place this holding as being part of the line of
nineteenth century decisions that led to the doctrine of fair use in the twentieth century.72 Alan
Latman’s observation of “the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal

68

See generally Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879) (discussing the commonality of map legends, but
failing to mention its fair use).
69

See Brief for Appellants, supra note 44, at 4–7, 9. The syllabus to the Lawyer’s Edition notes that counsel
for the appellants, cited Jollie v. Jacques, 1 Blatchf. 618; Green v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 199; Drury v.
Ewing, 1 Bond, 540; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Emerson v. Davies, 3 id. 768; Gray v. Russell,
1 id. 11; Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 309; [and] Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchf. 256.

Perris, 99 U.S. at 674.
See Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950) (citing Perris, 99 U.S. at 676) (“[W]hat
is fair use depends upon many circumstances. It has generally been construed that an infringement consists in
copying some substantial or material part of a work.”); see also M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co.,
298 F. 470, 477 (E.D.S.C. 1924) (citing Perris, 99 U.S. at 676) (“It has been said that in deciding questions of this
sort the court must look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which this may prejudice the sale, diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the
original work.”), aff'd, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
70

71

See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 67, at § 10:10.

72

L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 447–48 (1998).
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maxim de minimis non curat lex” is relevant here—it can be hard to separate the embryonic fair
use and de minimis doctrines for copyright.73
The closing line of this first holding, that there had been no copyright infringement
because there had not only been no copying, but indeed the two works “[did] not convey the
same information,” is an interesting approach to the copyright infringement analysis, albeit one
that has not found its way into the case law.74 Interestingly, this has become part of the fair
dealing analysis in the United Kingdom, where one of the leading cases held that if the copied
material is “used to convey the same information as the author, for a rival purpose, that may be
unfair.”75
B. The Second Holding: Protectibility of Systems and Designations
Having addressed the charges of literal copying at issue in this case, the Court then
turned to whether the symbols and colors used by Perris and reused by Hexamer could be
protected by copyright, and once again found in the negative.76 On this count the Court held that
Perris et al. held no exclusive right in “the form of the characters they employ to express their
ideas.”77 The Court made clear that “it has never been supposed that a simple copyright of the
map gave the publisher an exclusive right to the use upon other maps of the particular signs and
73

ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY NO. 14, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG. 30 (Comm. Print 1960); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 n.34 (1984)
(quoting id.).
74

Perris, 99 U.S. at 676; see Bullinger v. Mackey, 4 F. Cas. 649, 649–50 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,127)
(analyzing whether a work conveys the same information in determining infringement); see also W. Publ. Co. v.
Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861, 863 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909) (addressing the plaintiff’s argument that
something cannot be a copy if it is not identical).
75

Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 at 94.

76

Perris, 99 U.S. at 676. One difficulty of the Perris opinion is that it never makes this pivot clear—it
requires knowing the works and briefing to understand that different subject matter is being considered.
77

Id.

12

key which he saw fit to adopt for the purposes of his delineations.”78 The Court thus concluded
that Hexamer had not engaged in copyright infringement of the plaintiff’s work: “All he ha[d]
done at any time ha[d] been to use to some extent their system of arbitrary signs and their key.”79
In other words, the Supreme Court refused to recognize any protection under copyright law for
the legend, symbols, or color scheme of a map.
There are two aspects to this holding—a narrower one about the copyrightability of
headings or symbols for classifying and organizing information, and a broader one about the
dichotomy between idea and expression.80 As one unpublished decision citing Perris for this
proposition explained, “[t]he copyright laws are designed to protect the publisher or artist against
individuals who might seek to copy the production. The idea is not protected.”81 As a general
statement of the dichotomy between idea and expression, Perris was generally cited in tandem
with Baker v. Selden, and was usually cited second since Baker was a year later.82 Eventually,
cases would stop citing Perris, and only cite Baker as the bedrock of the dichotomy between idea
and expression.83 However, as will be explored in greater detail below, Perris is in some ways a

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

See id.

81

Longgood v. Elliot-Wehner Foundry & Mfg., No. 1881, 1932 WL 27369, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 1932)
(citing Perris, 99 U.S. at 676).
82

Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 255 n.1 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Dunham v.
Gen. Mills, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Mass. 1953); Russell v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571, 572 (D. Mass.
1934); Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10
(C.C.D. Cal. 1896) (“A copyright gives no exclusive property in the ideas of an author. These are public property,
and any one may use them as such.”).
83

See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
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superior vehicle for understanding this dichotomy, since it is not freighted by the patent versus
copyright distinction that was at issue in Baker.84
In fact, the omission of the patent/copyright distinction—the concept that patents and
copyrights represent protections for fundamentally different types of mental creations, is notable
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Perris, especially since the Circuit Court’s extremely terse
decision does focus on the fact that Perris had not received a patent for his system of organizing
and identifying features on his maps.85 Indeed, there is no mention anywhere of the elder Perris
trying to receive a patent for his use of colors and symbols for his maps, and this makes sense—
it seems highly unlikely such a patent would be granted.86
In addition to being more broadly about the dichotomy between idea and expression,
Perris has special applicability to cases about copyright in symbols and colors, and is of course
directly on point in cases regarding copyrights in map symbols.87 Perris has thus been applied to
preclude a finding of infringement in cases of similarly arranged charts for false teeth,88 making
a third-party map of West’s National Reporter System,89 correcting one’s own map with
reference to a copyrighted map,90 regarding display of an iron railings in catalogs at similar

84

See Perris, 99 U.S. at 676; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).

85

Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 30.

86

See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).

87

See S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 752 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889); Christianson v. W. Pub. Co., 149
F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Chamberlin v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 23 F.2d 541, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1928);
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Bros., 246 F. Supp. 987, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1965); Official Aviation Guide Co. v.
Am. Aviation Assocs., 150 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1945); Alexandria Drafting Co. v. Amsterdam, Nos. 95-1987,
95-6036, 1997 WL 325769, at *7, *9 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1997) (mem.) (subsequently vacated on June 25, 1998).
88

See S.S. White Dental Co., 38 F. at 752.

89

See Christianson, 149 F.2d at 203–04.

90

See Chamberlin, 23 F.2d at 542–43.
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angles and lighting,91 keying airline schedules to maps, 92and copying “trap streets” into maps of
one’s own creation.93 However, almost all of such cases were reported long before the beginning
of the digital age, and none of these decisions deal with issues of digital copying.94
Following the lawsuit, both Perris and Hexamer continued making maps of their
respective cities.95 Perris died in 1887,96 and two years later the Perris Company was absorbed
by Sanborn, which had become the dominant force in fire insurance maps.97 Hexamer continued
to publish and revise fire insurance maps until his death in 1905.98 His son C.J. Hexamer
continued in the business until 1915, until he too sold the business to Sanborn.99 Sanborn has
continued in this business to this day, advertising 1.2 million fire maps dating back to 1866.100
III. IN THE SHADOW OF BAKER V. SELDEN
Although the case had already been pending before the Supreme Court for several years
before Perris was decided, the following term the Court decided Baker v. Selden, a case about
whether a book describing an accounting system would prevent the publication of a book
91

See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh, 246 F. Supp. at 989.

92

See Official Aviation Guide Co., 150 F.2d at 175.

93

See Alexandria Drafting Co. v. Amsterdam, Nos. 95-1987, 95-6036, 1997 WL 325769, at *7, *9 (E.D. Pa.
June 4, 1997) (mem.) (subsequently vacated on June 25, 1998).
94

See S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 751 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889); Christianson v. W. Pub. Co., 149
F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Chamberlin, 23 F.2d at 540; Blumcraft of Pittsburgh, 246 F. Supp. at 987; Official
Aviation Guide Co., 150 F.2d at 173; Alexandria Drafting Co., 1997 WL 325769, at *1.
95

OSWALD, supra note 4, at 17, 23.

96

Obituary of William G. Perris, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 14, 1887, at 5.
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OSWALD, supra note 4, at 17.
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Id. at 23.
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Id.
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Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps, SANBORN, http://www.sanborn.com/sanborn-fire-insurance-maps/ (last
visited Oct. 6, 2017).

15

describing a similar accounting system.101 The story of Baker v. Selden has already been told
elsewhere,102 but a brief recitation of the case and its background is relevant to understanding
why Baker and not Perris became the dominant case regarding the dichotomy between idea and
expression.
A. Baker v. Selden
Baker v. Selden was a dispute, much like Perris v. Hexamer, between the plaintiff’s heirs
and the defendant.103 Selden had developed a new system of double-entry bookkeeping for
government accounting, and had received a copyright for his book of forms that embodied this
system.104 Selden’s book was mostly made up of forms—Selden printed up a large number of
copies of these books, but wound up deeply in debt when they failed to sell.105 A few years after
Selden’s publication, Baker published his own system of double-entry bookkeeping for
government accounting, with additional innovations making it easier to use, embodied in a
cheaper volume.106 Baker’s system was a major success, and four years later, in 1871, Selden
died, leaving his estate deeply in debt with the copyright in his bookkeeping text as its only
asset.107 The following year Selden’s widow sued Baker for copyright infringement for his
booking system which incorporated many of the innovations of Selden’s booking system.108 In
101

See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 99–100 (1880).

102

See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship
and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 159–93 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
eds., 2006).
103

See Samuelson, supra note 102, at 162–63; see also Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 1.

104

Samuelson, supra note 102, at 160.

105

Id. at 161.

106

Id. at 161–62.

107

Id. at 162.

108

Id. at 162–63.
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1874, the Circuit Court in Ohio ruled in favor of Selden’s widow and found that Baker had
infringed Selden’s copyright.109The case then went to the United States Supreme Court, where
both parties were represented by fairly prestigious counsel—Baker was represented by a former
Governor of Ohio and a former state judge,110 while Selden was represented by a former member
of Congress from Ohio.111
Justice Bradley’s decision was issued in January of 1880 and sided firmly with Baker.112
The Court explained that what was protected by Selden’s copyright was his book, not the system
embodied in that book, holding that “there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and
the art which it is intended to illustrate.”113 The Court then discussed the distinction between
patents and copyrights, and that the publication of a book in no way protected the system
embodied in the book.114 Indeed, Pamela Samuelson has argued persuasively that Baker v.
Selden is really much more about the distinction between patents and copyrights than it is the
distinction between idea and expression.115 The Court thus held that Baker had not infringed

109

Samuelson, supra note 102, at 165–66. No opinion was written by Judge Swing in this case, but the
appellate record printed by the U.S. Supreme Court contains the ruling of Judge Swing as recorded on the docket. Id.
See generally Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, No. 95 (indicating that Judge Swing ruled
on the docket). Interestingly, Judge Swing would express a broad view of the copyright clause of the Constitution
several years later, in the first case to address the constitutionality of the 1870 Trademark Act. See Duwell v.
Bohmer, 8 F. Cas. 181, 182–83 (S.D. Ohio 1878) (No. 4213). That same year he was part of a divided court in the
criminal prosecutions of W. W. Johnson, T.E. McNamara, and N. S. Reeder for trademark infringement, which
would become one of the three cases that comprised the Trade-Mark Cases, which overruled his decision in Duwell.
See 100 U.S. 82, 85–86, 91 (1879).
110

Samuelson, supra note 102, at 172–73.
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Id.; Biography of Milton Southard, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS,
bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000688 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99, 107 (1880).
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Id. at 102, 107.

114

Id. at 103.
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Selden’s copyright, and then further held that books of blank forms were not generally eligible
for copyright.116 Although the Chief Justice’s docket books indicate that Justices Harlan and
Clifford voted contrary to the Court’s ultimate ruling, no written dissent was issued, either as a
result of a vote change to achieve consensus or simply due to the overwhelming workload the
Court faced at the time.117 By contrast, the vote in Perris was unanimous.118
B. Baker v. Selden Ascendant
Counsel for Baker reprinted the entire text of the Court’s recent Perris opinion in the
final pages of their brief, noting “[h]ow admirably this decision applies to the case at bar.”119
However, the decision in Baker failed to cite to Perris, for reasons that are unclear.120

See Samuelson, supra note 102, at 177 (“Modern readers come to the Baker decision expecting to find in it
a classic statement of the idea/expression distinction, . . . [t]o come afresh to the Baker decision [one will] . . .
discern how important the patent/copyright distinction was to the Baker ruling.”).
115

116

Baker, 101 U.S. at 107.

117

See Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 1879, Baker v. Seldon, No. 95, at 126 (on
file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 40,
at 77. Lee Epstein et al. would disagree. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 362–63 (asserting that the subsequent lack of a
recorded dissent reflects the change of a vote to reflect consensus).
118

See Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 1878, Perris v. Hexamer, No. 93, at 131
(on file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32). Although not per se germane to this article, it
is interesting to note that two other well-known Supreme Court cases on copyright from this era that have generally
been considered unanimous in fact were not. See Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term
1879, Nos. 705, 711, 719, at 55–57 (on file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32)
[hereinafter Docket Book for Trade-Mark Cases]; see also Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct.
Term 1883, Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, No. 1071, at 163 (on file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers,
Box 30) [hereinafter Docket Book for Burrow-Giles]. In the Trade-Mark Cases Justice Clifford would have held the
1870 Trademark Act constitutional, while in Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, Justice Harlan would have voted that no
copyright infringement had occurred in the copying of a photograph of Oscar Wilde. See Docket Book for TradeMark Cases, supra, at 55–57; see also Docket Book for Burrow-Giles, supra, at 163. These check marks in a docket
book pose fascinating counterfactuals, and it is a pity no more information exists on why they disagreed with the
majority.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 26, Baker, 101 U.S. 99, No. 95 (“There, as here, the parts were separate.
Certain parts were claimed to infringe. Other parts of the new maps were very unlike the original, and as to these
there was no infringement. Still more, there was no infringement as to the parts which were alike.”).
119

120

See generally Baker, 101 U.S. 99 (citing several English cases, but no United States cases).
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Regardless, in the early years after these decisions were issued, they were treated as being of
relatively equal importance.121 For instance, Copinger’s Britain-based treatise on copyright law
used Perris as the case used for the proposition that “[t]here can be no copyright in a mere plan
of a work; nor any exclusive property in a general subject or in the particular method of treating
it,” while Baker was relegated to a footnote.122 However, in the twentieth century Baker began to
pull away in importance, and as of January 1, 2017, it had been cited in 334 cases, according to
Westlaw.123 By contrast, Perris has been cited by thirty-seven reported decisions, including only
once in the twenty-first century and five more times between 1960 and 1999.124 An even starker
illustration of their differing importance comes from the trial court documents available on
Westlaw: Baker is cited 448 times up to January 1, 2017,125 while Perris is only cited once.126
Baker v. Selden “remains an enduring authority for its preeminent role in arbitrating between
protectable expression and unprotectable ideas in copyrighted works.”127 Perris v. Hexamer has
become a curio.

121

See, e.g., WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT, IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 41–42
(4th ed. 1904).
Id. Both Perris and Baker were decided slightly too late to appear in Eaton Drone’s seminal 1879 treatise.
EATON S. DRONE A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND
THE UNITED STATES, EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYRIGHT IN DRAMATIC
AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS (1979)
122

123

Citing References to Baker v. Selden, supra note 3.
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Citing References to Perris v. Hexamer, supra note 3.
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Citing References to Baker v. Selden, supra note 3.
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Citing References to Perris v. Hexamer, supra note 3.
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Olson, supra note 1, at 604.
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IV. PERRIS AS A FORGOTTEN CASE
With Perris v. Hexamer essentially forgotten in the twenty-first century, even as its
contemporary Baker v. Selden remains a central part of the canon, two immediate questions are
raised—why Perris became a forgotten case, and why we should care.
A. Why was Perris Forgotten
Although on examination Perris gives us a powerful vision of copyright for ideas and
systems, on the surface it is a cursory opinion by a Chief Justice who would die of overwork a
decade later.128 It does not explain its reasoning, and understanding that both literal copying and
arguments for protection of a system were involved requires a close reading of the terse
statement of facts.129
The most basic reason to think why Perris v. Hexamer is generally forgotten, while Baker
v. Selden is still widely cited, is simply that Perris is an extremely short opinion by an
overworked Chief Justice that does not always elaborate as fully on its reasoning as it could, and
is bereft of citations.130 The opinion of Justice Bradley in Baker v. Selden, on the other hand, is
approximately five times the length of Perris, and explains its rationale with reference to
authority.131 A number of studies have found a correlation between opinion length and the
number of citations that opinion received.132 For instance, in a piece analyzing treatment of
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Biography of Morrison Waite, HISTORY CENT., http://www.historycentral.com/Bio/rec/MorrisonWaite.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675 (1879).
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See Citing References to Baker v. Seldon, supra note 3. See generally Perris, 99 U.S. 674 (a two page
opinion citing no cases).
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See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–07 (1880).

132

See e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions
and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 471, 484 (2010).
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Supreme Court opinions from 1969 to 1985, Ryan C. Black and James F. Spriggs II found that
an opinion in the seventy-fifth percentile for length received on average fourteen percent more
citations than an opinion in the twenty-fifth percentile.133 A further study by these authors,
looking to Supreme Court opinions from 1946 to 2004, found a minor positive correlation
between length and amount of citation over the first few decades, but that the effect disappeared
within fifteen years.134 However, the authors of these pieces acknowledge that for the era starting
in 1953 the median opinion was 4,067 words, while for opinions written before 1886, the median
was 1,380 words.135 Further, while the Court was issuing over 250 opinions per year in the late
nineteenth century, it issued only 65 in 2005.136 Thus, the question remains whether the minor
effect observed by Black and Spriggs is more pronounced for earlier eras of the Supreme Court
where the Court was churning out many more opinions of more variable significance.
To answer this question I turned to the Free Law Project, which makes the entire run of
the United States Reports available freely on CourtListener.com, along with many other more
recent opinions.137 CourtListener has over four million opinions in its database, with all citations
between opinions in the database, making analysis comparatively straightforward.138 The entire
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Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court
Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 676–77 (2008).
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Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 10
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 351 (2013).
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An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, supra note 133, at 639–40.
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Id. at 633.

Opinions – Supreme Court of the United States, JACOB BURNS LAW LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES,
http://law.gwu.libguides.com/scotus/opinions (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
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Frequently Asked Questions, COURTLISTENER, https://www.courtlistener.com/faq/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2017). CourtListener does have a number of major omissions that result in lower citation counts than one would find
in Westlaw and Lexis, the most major being lower federal court opinions from before 1925, and Federal District
Court opinions until much more recently. See DITTAKAVI RAO, A SHORT AND QUICK GUIDE TO NO-COST AND/OR
LOW-COST LEGAL RESEARCH USING THE INTERNET 19 (2015),
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library of Supreme Court opinions was analyzed, and four data points were extracted – the year
the opinion was filed, the word count of the opinion, the number of citations to the opinion, and
the number of internal citations in the opinion. The Courtlistener database has some weaknesses
compared to commercial databases like Westlaw and Lexis, chiefly a lack of coverage of older
federal and state cases, but these weaknesses should be uniform for all cases of certain periods,
and serve to highlight relative influence of an opinion in the past 40 years.
A review of all 29,344 Supreme Court opinions139 shows that for the first quartile of
opinions in terms of age (the period ending in 1887),140 the correlation between word count and
rate of citation is statistically significant, although not as significant as it would be for the final
two quartiles, representing opinions from 1920 forward.141 This study provides substance to the
intuition that a short opinion like Perris is less likely to become canonical.
The fact that Perris does not make clear it is about both literal and non-literal copying is
also perhaps why the decision is not discussed more—without a careful reading of the case it is
not clear the decision is talking about two different types of alleged copying which require a
different type of approach.142 Since Perris is about both literal copying of the map legend and the
allegation that using the same symbols and colors on a map constitutes copying, it actually

http://www.law.duq.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Library/Research%20Guides/No-Cost-Legal-Research-2015Rao.pdf.
139

Opinions of less than 200 words were excluded from the analysis, since these are almost uniformly not
substantive.
140
Quartiles are by number of opinions, not by years.
141
See Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions Before 1887, COURTLISTENER,
https://www.courtlistener.com/?type=o&q=&type=o&order_by=score+desc&stat_Precedential=on&filed_before=1
887-12-31 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017); see also Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions After 1920,
COURTLISTENER,
https://www.courtlistener.com/?q=&type=o&order_by=citeCount+desc&stat_Precedential=on&filed_after=191912-31 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675–76 (1878).
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speaks to two different types of conduct.143However, it is easy to think that its holding about de
minimis copying is really all it has to say, and that was largely how it was applied outside the
context of copying of maps, where the second holding would also be applied.144 Indeed, as
discussed above, there are perilously few reported decisions that apply the broader holding of
Perris regarding nonliteral copying outside the context of maps.
Another possibility worth taking seriously is that to interpret Perris as being the equal of
Baker in terms of its holding is to over-read a short decision which could be easily read as a
casual dismissal of the plaintiff’s allegations. The Court referenced no authority in Perris, and
decisions citing no authority are much less likely to be cited in the future.145 Looking at the same
data from CourtListener, but this time counting the number of citations to authorities in cases,
the correlation is even stronger in the quartile of cases ending in 1887, although perhaps not to a
significant degree (the difference is much greater for cases between 1887 and 1920).146 However,
it is not clear that the difference in authorities and length alone account for the obscurity of
Perris.

143

See id. at 675.
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See PATRY, supra note 67, at § 10:10; see also S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 752 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1889).
145

See Olson, supra note 1, at 606. At least one commenter has implied that the obscurity of Perris is due to
the fact that it “did not cite any authorities for the holding it expressed.” Olson, supra note 1, at 606.
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See Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions Before 1888, COURTLISTENER,
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before=1887 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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B. Perris v. Hexamer v. Baker v. Selden
Perris and Baker have largely been treated as being about the same question, sometimes
distilled into the concept of the idea/expression dichotomy.147 However, the facts of the cases are
distinct in a way that actually makes Perris much more pertinent to modern questions of
copyright than Baker. In Baker, the Court found that a work was not eligible for copyright to the
extent it merely represented the embodiment of an abstract system for accounting that might be
appropriate for a patent, but not for a copyright.148 In Perris, on the other hand, there was no real
argument about whether the various symbols and colors would be appropriate for a patent at the
level of the Supreme Court;149 the question was whether copyright protected the use of the same
colors and symbols for a specific purpose.150 The Court was also faced with the question of
whether the copying of the legend by Hexamer constituted infringement, a question that was not
at issue in Baker—the short preamble in the Selden book does not seem to have been copied by
Baker.151 Put another way, Perris points to a view of the dichotomy between idea and expression
that is closer to the question of nonliteral copying in the software context than it is to the patent
versus copyright distinction of Baker v. Selden.
One situation where Perris is superior to Baker is the arrangement of commands in a
computer program. For instance, in the First Circuit’s well-known opinion in Lotus Development
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See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 255, n.1 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Simms v.
Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 (C.C.D. Cal. 1896); Dunham v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Mass. 1953);
Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Russell v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571,
572 (D. Mass. 1934).
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See generally Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1878) (discussing only copyright).
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Perris, 99 U.S. at 675.
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Compare Perris, 99 U.S. at 675–76 (emphasizing the commonality of map legends), with Baker, 101 U.S.
at 100–01 (focusing on the plaintiff’s system of book-keeping rather than the preamble of the plaintiff’s book).
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Corp. v. Borland International, when facing the question of whether the copying of the menus
from the spreadsheet program “Lotus 1-2-3” into Borland’s spreadsheet application constituted
copyright infringement, the Court specifically rejected Baker as being a relevant precedent
despite Borland’s “vigorous” arguments in favor of its applicability.152 However, the Court noted
that “unlike Selden, Lotus does not claim to have a monopoly over its accounting system,” it
only claimed “the commands it uses to operate the computer.”153 With Perris, on the other hand,
the work claimed for copyright was a table of symbols and colors (or, put another way,
commands), and the use of those symbols in using a creative work for which infringement was
not claimed (the map itself).154 It is not clear why the Court did not cite Perris, but it likely was
not even suggested. On appeal of the case to the United States Supreme Court, after succeeding
under more recent case law in the First Circuit, Borland’s merits brief devoted an entire
subsection to Baker v. Selden and cited it extensively elsewhere—yet it does not even mention
Perris v. Hexamer.155
Perhaps the most direct analogy of Perris in a computer context is a high-stakes case that
remains ongoing despite several decisions—Oracle v. Google.156 In that case, the copyright issue

49 F.3d 807, 813–14 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Borland even supplied th[e] court with a video that, with special
effects, show[ed] Selden's paper forms ‘melting’ into a computer screen and transforming into Lotus 1-2-3.”).
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Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 814.
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See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675.
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See Brief for Respondent at 56, Lotus, 49 F.3d 807 (No. 93-2003). The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam
without an opinion. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996) (per curiam). Among those
briefs to the Supreme Court, available on Lexis and Westlaw (and thus searchable), the only citation to Perris v.
Hexamer made to the Supreme Court in a brief in the modern era was by Rural Telephone Service as respondent in
their case against Feist Publications, where they cited Perris for the proposition that copying phony telephone
directory entries constituted copying of a substantial amount of the work. Brief for Respondent at 44, Feist Publ’ns.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (No. 89-1909).
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See Oracle Am. v. Google, 750 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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was whether the reuse of class names by Google for the Java programming language infringed
Oracle’s copyright in the original Java programming language, where the evidence showed that
Google had otherwise written its own version of the programming language from scratch.157 The
analogy to Perris is straightforward—in both cases there is a class of defined functions (a table
with definitions of map symbols in Perris),158 which are then used as part of a copyrighted work
where no infringement is alleged (the programming language in Oracle, and the city maps in
Perris).159 However, despite the millions upon millions of legal fees and costs spent in this case,
there is no indication that anyone has cited Perris.160
V. CONCLUSION: A RESURGENT PERRIS V. HEXAMER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
In 2013, a lawsuit was brought arguing that Madonna’s hit song Vogue from 1990
infringed the copyright in the 1983 dance track Love Break by The Salsoul Orchestra—
specifically that a horn hit sampled from the 1983 song lasting roughly one-fifth of a second
constituted infringement.161 The district court held that the sample was not infringing, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.162 In the Ninth Circuit, the Court relied on Perris v. Hexamer to reject the
rule in the Bridgeport Music cases that no amount of copying of a sound recording is
permissible, and thus held that there is a de minimis exception to copyright law even for sound
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See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675.

159
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recordings.163 This opinion from June 2016 was the first reported citation to Perris since 1978,
and yet the decision retains its force as a Supreme Court precedent on what is—and is not—
copying.164
There is no reason why Perris should not undergo a similar resurgence in the area of the
dichotomy between idea and expression, especially concerning software copyrights. While it has
only been sporadically cited and mostly involved copying under the 1831 Copyright Act,165
Perris v. Hexamer offers an approach that is substantially superior to attempting to analogize
Baker v. Selden to increasingly inapposite factual and legal situations.
APPENDIX: THE MAPS AND LEGENDS
The Perris and Hexamer maps are available in multiple places online, most notably
through the New York Public Library and Free Library of Philadelphia, respectively. 166 Since the
litigation was focused in part on the copying of the legends from the maps, I have included
reproductions of the keys at issue below:
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VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880–81.

See Citing References to Perris v. Hexamer, supra note 3. It isn’t clear where the citation to Perris came
from aside from research by the Court or its clerks. The brief for Madonna does not mention Perris. See Brief for
Appellee at v–vi, VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d 871 (No. 2:12-CV-05967BRO).
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the 1870 Act. See Act of July 8, 1870, Ch. 230, §§ 87–88, 90, 16 Stat. 198, 212–13 (1870).
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LIBRARY OF PHILA., http://www.freelibrary.org/ (search “Hexamer” or “Perris”; click “map” on the left).
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Figure 1167

167

This is the legend from the title page of the 1855 Maps of the City of New York First, Second, Third, &
Fourth Ward, by William Perris, which Ernest Hexamer would have worked on. William Perris, Maps of the City of
New York: Volume 2 Index Map (on file with The N.Y. Pub. Library Digital Collections),
https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47e0-bfd7-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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Figure 2168
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This is the legend from Maps of the City of Philadelphia, published in 1860 by Hexamer and Lochner,
available at https://libwww.freelibrary.org/digital/item/MHXLBH00001. It is an obvious copy of the legend from
the Perris map with a listing for three-story buildings awkwardly added on the top right. Subsequent editions of the
Hexamer maps utilized a modified version of this system, and have a key on each plate instead of one key at the
beginning of the volume, eliminating a claim of direct copying and limiting the issue to one of copying the system.
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